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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a scenario in which a city is in unrest; a man has been killed 
at the hands of police officers, so protestors have been filling the streets for 
days, demanding change.1 In the midst of a protest, a semi-truck enters a 
closed road and barrels through thousands of protestors. The driver is taken 
into custody. Law enforcement officers hold an impromptu press 
conference to inform the city, although the conference is closed to the 
public because of a global pandemic. In the press conference, the officers 
state that a man has been taken into custody for swerving into the crowds, 
and he has ties to a right-wing extremist group; however, the investigation is 
ongoing. The media promptly reports on these official statements to amplify 
this relevant government investigation to the public. Once the man is 
released from custody, he wants to sue the media for defamation—he is not 
a member of a right-wing extremist group, and the collision was an accident. 
Should the media be liable for reporting the officials’ defamatory 
statements, especially those of public concern? Before the Minnesota 
Supreme Court extended the fair and accurate reporting privilege to cover 
official news conferences in Larson v. Gannett Co.,2 media organizations 
could have been liable just for republishing the officers’ defamatory 
statements.3  
What if, instead of just republishing the officers’ statements, the 
                                                           
ǂ Rachel Lantz, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022. The Author is a second-year law student at 
Mitchell Hamline School of Law. She is inspired to learn about the law each and every day 
because of her supportive family and friends, including her mother, Cheryl Lantz, who has 
taught her that knowledge is power. Special thanks to Professor Raleigh Levine and Claire 
Gutknecht for their support and expertise throughout the publication process. 
1 This imaginary scenario is based on real events that occurred in summer 2020 in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota. However, there was never a press conference in which officers 
made defamatory statements about the semi-truck driver. See Pam Louwagie & Jessie Van 
Berkel, Tensions on Streets Slowly Ebb in Wake of George Floyd’s Death, STAR TRIB. (June 
2, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/tensions-on-streets-ebb-in-wake-of-george-floyd-s-
death/570942192/ [https://perma.cc/37BM-GTAD] (explaining the killing of George Floyd 
and resulting protests); see also Tanker Truck Drives Into Minneapolis George Floyd 
Protestors on I-35W Bridge; Driver in Custody, CBS MINN. (May 31, 2020), 
https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/05/31/breaking-semi-truck-appears-to-drive-through-
protest-marchers-on-i-35w-bridge/ [https://perma.cc/CVS6-HFT2]. 
2 940 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. 2020).  
3 Id. at 132 (noting that extending the fair and accurate reporting privilege to official law 
enforcement news conferences and official press releases is an issue of first impression in 
Minnesota). 
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media reported that the man was not only brought into custody, but was also 
arrested and charged because he intended to run over the protestors? That 
exaggerated report, while loosely based on information garnered from the 
news conference, would not be a fair and accurate representation of the 
officers’ statements. Should the report still be privileged? If not, how should 
the court determine when exaggerations go too far? The Larson court had 
to grapple with these exact questions as they established a new inquiry to 
determine whether a report is fair and accurate.4 
Larson is a case about defamation, an individual’s ability to recover, 
and the power of the media. In this case, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
extended the fair and accurate reporting privilege—for the first time—to 
protect media publications “that accurately and fairly summarize statements 
about a matter of public concern made by law enforcement officers during 
an official press conference and in an official news release.”5 This privilege 
relieves a media company of liability for publishing defamatory statements 
spoken by officials.6 The power of this privilege is both encouraging and 
frightening. On one hand, protecting the media from liability may serve 
public interest by advancing and unveiling corrupt government practices. 
On the other hand, if not contained, this privilege may advance the media’s 
ability to report disinformation without repercussion. Even worse, the 
privilege could prevent individuals from recovering for their damaged 
reputation—a right guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution.7 
 This Paper begins with an explanation of the origins of 
defamation law and the fair and accurate reporting privilege, and it presents 
the factual and procedural history of the Larson case. The Analysis argues 
that the court correctly extended the privilege’s scope per precedent and 
policy and established a comprehensive test that theoretically balances an 
individual’s and the media’s conflicting interests. However, by remanding 
the case, there remains a lack of clear boundaries concerning what 
constitutes a fair and accurate report.8 While the court reasonably protected 
the media for public benefit, an individual’s ability to recover for his or her 
tarnished reputation may have been diminished. 
II. HISTORY 
A. Origins of defamation law and privileges 
The tort of defamation allows a plaintiff to recover against a person 
                                                           
4 Id. at 133. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
8 See Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 143. 
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who published false statements injuring the plaintiff’s reputation.9 English 
common law originally imposed strict liability against those who published 
defamatory statements of another.10 The common law rule of republication 
holds publishers liable because “tale bearers are as bad as tale makers.”11   
The development of privileges helped eliminate the harsh sting of 
defamation liability.12 Absolute privileges have generally attached to specific 
governmental proceedings to encourage people to speak freely without fear 
of liability.13 Conditional or qualified privileges protect speech that deserves 
some immunity, but the protection may be forfeited if the privilege is 
abused.14 The fair and accurate reporting privilege is a qualified privilege 
that can shield the press from defamation liability.15  
B.  Development of the fair and accurate reporting privilege in common 
law and constitutional law 
 The fair and accurate reporting privilege originated as an 
exception to the common law rule of republication, creating a common law 
qualified defense.16 With the fair and accurate reporting privilege, a 
publisher could repeat defamatory statements made by others without 
liability.17 Because the privilege protects those who publish defamatory 
statements, the underlying substance of the defamatory statement is not at 
issue. Instead, the privilege is upheld if the publisher’s summary of the 
defamatory statement is fair and accurate.18  
This privilege also has a constitutional source that originated when 
the Supreme Court articulated First Amendment free speech implications 
in defamation suits.19 The Supreme Court rulings in New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. constitutionally protected the 
                                                           
9 See Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Minn. 1985). 
10 See Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 328 (Minn. 2000); see 
also Michael C. Cox & Elizabeth M. Callaghan, To Be or not to Be, Malice is the Question: 
An Analysis of Nebraska’s Fair Report Privilege from a Press Perspective, 36 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 21, 23 (2003). 
11 See Cox & Callaghan, supra note 10, at 21. 
12 See id. 
13 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES IN MEDIA CONTENT: INTERNET, 
BROADCAST, & PRINT § 6:73 (2d ed.) (2020). 
14 Id. 
15 See Cox & Callaghan, supra note 10, at 27. 
16 See SMOLLA, supra note 13, at § 6:73. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. § 6:83.  
19 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); see also Cox & Callaghan, 
supra note 10, at 21. 
4
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media’s right to discuss public officials and figures.20 In Sullivan, the First 
Amendment protected a newspaper that published an editorial critiquing a 
public official in his official capacity.21 Sullivan created an “actual malice” 
standard that required a public official to prove a defamatory statement was 
made with knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity to recover for 
defamation.22 This test helped “protect the enterprise of news reporting 
from the chilling effects of defamation suits.”23 As a result, Sullivan protects 
false reports about public officials published without actual malice.24 Sullivan 
made falsity an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case so that plaintiffs 
have the burden to prove the inaccuracy of defendants’ statements.25 This 
landmark case protected the press’s freedom to report on public officials.26  
Gertz clarified that private individuals could prevail “on a less 
demanding showing than that required by New York Times,” recognizing 
that private individuals have a greater interest in protecting their reputation 
than those who place themselves in the public eye.27 Gertz also clarified that 
states may decide the liability standard for publishers of defamatory 
information regarding private individuals, as long as they do not impose 
strict liability or violate First Amendment considerations.28 This case 
recognizes the two opposing interests in Larson: a private person’s ability to 
recover from a defamatory statement and the press’s free speech in 
reporting on official reports, regardless of its defamatory nature.29 In doing 
so, the Gertz Court suggested a private individuals’ right falls between the 
harsh, strict liability imposed at common law and the heightened “actual 
malice” standard required by Sullivan for public officials.30 In recognizing 
the press’s need to speak freely, the Gertz Court ensured the press had “the 
‘breathing space’ essential to [its] fruitful exercise.”31 Gertz recognizes a 
minimum threshold of liability, compelled by the First Amendment, by 
requiring that states not impose defamation fault without liability.32  
The Supreme Court has provided minimum constitutional 
guidance for states imposing defamation liability standards. Philadelphia 
                                                           
20 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (allowing the press a right to freely discuss public officials by 
requiring a showing of malice to prove defamation); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 346 (1974) (differentiating the defamation standard of Sullivan for private individuals). 
21 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282–83.  
22 Id. at 281–82.  
23 Id. at 282.  
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 270–71. 
26 Id. 
27 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974). 
28 Id. at 347. 
29 Id. at 346. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 342. 
32 Id. at 347. 
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Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps builds on Gertz’s new boundaries for private 
figures, holding that “the Constitution still supplants the standards of the 
common law” when speech is made about a private figure regarding a matter 
of public concern.33 Thus, a plaintiff bringing a defamation claim under 
these circumstances has a greater burden than a purely private plaintiff, but 
a burden less than a public figure.34 As in both Gertz and Sullivan, it is the 
plaintiff’s burden to show falsity before recovering damages.35 The private 
figure in Hepps was required to prove falsity of the media defendant’s 
speech, which regarded a matter of public concern, before recovery.36  
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, a statute was unconstitutional 
because it imposed sanctions on media that accurately published a rape 
victim’s name obtained from judicial records that were open to public 
inspection and court proceedings.37 The Court found that a plaintiff’s 
privacy interest was lessened because the information was already available 
on a public record.38 As Justice White explained, the press is a vital 
connection between the citizen and the government.39 Florida Star v. B.J.F. 
further balanced free press and state-created privacy protections, holding 
that “where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully 
obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly 
tailored to a state interest of the highest order.”40 Thus, the Court recognized 
that imposing liability for truthful reporting may be more dangerous than 
many state interests.41 
Throughout these constitutional developments, confusion remains 
at the state level for both defamation plaintiffs and the media. Because Gertz 
allows states to establish their own standards for defamation law as long as 
they are not infringing upon free speech rights, various forms of the fair and 
accurate reporting privilege are recognized across jurisdictions.42 As a result, 
                                                           
33 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 776.  
36 Id. at 768–69.  
37 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).  
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 491 (“In a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with 
which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon 
the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations.”). 
40 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).  
41 Id.   
42 John J. Watkins Charles, Gertz and the Common Law of Defamation: Of Fault, Nonmedia 
Defendants, and Conditional Privileges, 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 823, 879 (1984). There are 
generally three ways states may approach such a conditional privilege: they may not recognize 
a privilege, have a privilege that may be defeated by “a showing of knowing falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth,” or allow the privilege to be defeated by “knowing falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth as well as such common-law methods as improper motive or excessive 
6
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states are inconsistent in their tests of fair and accurate reports, where the 
privilege applies, and what will defeat the privilege.43 This varied application 
causes confusing and different applications of the privilege across 
jurisdictions, to which Minnesota is no exception. 
C.  The fair and accurate reporting privilege in Minnesota 
The Minnesota Constitution recognized an individual’s right to 
recover for defamation by proclaiming an individual is “entitled to a certain 
remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his 
person, property or character . . . .”44 However, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court first limited this right by endorsing the fair and accurate reporting 
privilege in Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co.45 The court conservatively 
endorsed the privilege by holding that reports on judicial proceedings are 
privileged, but reports on judicial pleadings were outside the privilege’s safe 
harbor.46 The court drew the line between reports on pre-trial and post-trial 
materials.47 Reports on pre-trial materials are not privileged because the 
materials are not in the court’s control, and “publication can in no manner 
serve the administration of justice.”48 However, reports regarding claims 
made in court may be protected because a judge can ensure fair procedural 
safeguards for both parties.49 One reason for distinguishing between pre- and 
post-trial materials may be because the Nixon decision came before the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure’s safeguard against frivolous 
complaints, and so the court held an interest in ensuring proceedings were 
fairly moderated before the media reported.50 This first appearance of the 
fair and accurate reporting privilege in Minnesota held that reports may be 
protected if they fairly and accurately regard judicial proceedings.51 
However, since the 1907 Nixon decision, the United States free 
speech climate has changed due to the constitutional backdrop of Sullivan, 
Gertz, and other free speech developments.52 These changes caused the 
Minnesota Supreme Court to respond to Gertz by adopting a negligence 
standard, finding that a private individual may recover upon showing the 
                                                           
publication.” Id. However, most fair and accurate reporting privileges may be defeated by a 
showing the publication is not a fair or accurate report of the original proceeding. Id.  
43 Id.  
44 MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
45 See 101 Minn. 309, 313, 112 N.W. 258, 259 (1907). 
46 Id. 
47 See id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 137 (Minn. 2020). 
51 See id. 
52 See supra Section II.B. 
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defendant knew or should have known that the defamatory statement was 
false.53  
The fair and accurate reporting privilege has developed in 
Minnesota—although minimally—since its original appearance in Nixon 
through a combination of statutes and selective adoption by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court. A criminal defamation statute, adopted by the legislature 
post-Nixon, privileges communications that “consist of a fair and true report 
or a fair summary of any judicial, legislative or other public or official 
proceedings.”54 While this statute imposes criminal liability, the Minnesota 
Federal District Court has persuasively argued that because the criminal 
statute mentions “public or official proceedings,” news reports regarding 
official, public reports should also be privileged in the civil setting.55  
In Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., the Minnesota 
Supreme Court adopted the fair and accurate reporting privilege to cover 
legislative proceedings.56 A police officer brought a defamation suit against 
a local newspaper which reported a citizen’s alleged defamatory statements 
made about the officer at a city council meeting.57 The court adopted the 
privilege to cover these circumstances and reasoned that the “public interest 
is served by the fair and accurate dissemination of information concerning 
the events of public proceedings.”58 The court was persuaded by the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 611 comment b that states once a 
report is within the range of the fair and accurate reporting privilege, fault is 
determined by the report’s accuracy and not by a common law malice 
showing.59 Once extending the privilege to city council meetings, the court 
should have determined whether the newspaper article was fair and 
                                                           
53 Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 491 (Minn. 1985). 
54 MINN. STAT. § 609.765 subdiv. 3(3) (1963) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 609.765 
subdiv. 3(3) (2020)). 
55 See Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 973, 979 (D. Minn. 1978) 
(holding that an accurate report of a grand jury indictment did not constitute defamation). 
56 Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 333 (Minn. 2000) (holding 
that an officer’s defamation suit was defeated by the fair and accurate report privilege because 
the privilege extended to events that were regular business of a city council meeting, including 
a citizen’s ad hoc speech). 
57 Id. at 323. 
58 Id. at 332. 
59 Id. at 331. The other standard that could have been adopted is an “actual malice” standard 
in which a showing of “knowing or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement” 
must be made. Id. at 329. This standard is not satisfied if a plaintiff only proves that the 
defendant should have known a statement was false, without showing the defendant did know 
the statement was false. Id. Actual malice is still a lesser standard from common law malice 
which requires proof of “ill will or improper motive.” Id. 
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accurate, or whether the report was edited to be misleading.60 However, the 
court did not make this inquiry; it remanded the case to the district court to 
determine if additional contextual material—not on appeal—impermissibly 
commented on the officers’ integrity.61 Minnesotans were left without clear 
boundaries of what will defeat the fair and accurate reporting privilege. 
Yet, Moreno established that Minnesota’s fair and accurate 
reporting privilege protects fair and accurate reports of regular city council 
meetings, and the qualified privilege is “defeated by a showing that the 
report is not a fair and accurate report of that proceeding.”62 This was the 
last time the court addressed the fair and accurate reporting privilege until 
the Larson decision.   
III.  THE LARSON DECISION 
 In Larson v. Gannett Co., the plaintiff brought a defamation suit 
against the local media company after being falsely accused of murdering a 
police officer in Cold Spring, Minnesota.63 The plaintiff argued the media 
company should be liable for publishing defamatory statements naming him 
as the murderer, as the statements did not fairly and accurately represent 
the official news conferences and press releases regarding his arrest for the 
murder.64 On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court expanded the scope of 
the fair and accurate reporting privilege.65 The privilege now protects fair 
and accurate reports on official news conferences and press releases.66 The 
court also established a test to determine whether the media’s reports were 
fair and accurate—whether the reports created the same “gist” or “sting” as 
the original news conference and press release.67  
A.  Facts of the Larson case 
 In 2012, a Cold Spring police officer responded to a welfare 
check request on Ryan Larson, during which the officer was shot and 
killed.68 An hour later, officers entered Larson’s apartment, found Larson 
sleeping, and took him into custody on suspicion of murder.69 The next 
                                                           
60 Id. (replacing the common law requirements that a publication be made in good faith, 
without malice); see also Cox & Callaghan, supra note 10, at 30 (noting that common law 
malice created a qualified privilege). 
61 Moreno, 610 N.W.2d at 334. 
62 Id. “The privilege is not defeated by a showing of common law malice.” Id. 
63 Id. at 126. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 148. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 141. 
68 Id. at 126. The officer was shot twice outside the bar that Larson lived above. Id. 
69 Id. 
9
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morning, law enforcement officers held a live press conference and 
answered questions about the investigation.70 One officer reported that “the 
subject of the welfare check” had been taken into custody.71 The officials 
indicated that while the suspect was in custody, the investigation was active 
and ongoing.72 At the end of the press conference, another officer stated, 
“Ryan Larson was taken into custody and booked . . . in connection with 
this incident.”73 When media asked if there was any other person of interest 
for the murder, the officials responded, “we don’t have any information to 
believe that at this time.”74 The same day, the Minnesota Department of 
Public Safety released an official press release titled “Cold Spring Police 
Officer Killed in the Line of Duty.”75  
That night, Kare 11 released evening news and online reports that 
depicted Larson as a murderer, with headlines stating, “Police say that man—
identified as 34 year-old Ryan Larson—ambushed Officer Decker and shot 
him twice—killing him.”76 The St. Cloud Times newspaper also released 
numerous front-page articles alleging that Ryan Larson shot the officer.77 
 Larson was released from jail five days after being taken into 
custody and officially cleared as a suspect for the murder in 2013.78 Larson 
sued the Gannett Company, the owners of the media outlets, for defamation 
in eleven statements published in the Kare 11 television broadcasts, an 
online article, and in the St. Cloud Times newspaper articles.79 
B.  District Court and Court of Appeals decisions 
The district court jury trial occurred in 2016.80 While eleven 
statements were highlighted as grounds for defamation, three of the 
statements were declared not “capable of . . . defamatory meaning” and 
excluded from jury consideration.81 The district court instructed the jury 
using the “falsity” instruction—an instruction used to determine an element 
                                                           
70 Id. at 127. 
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. The press release discussed that investigators had taken Ryan Larson into custody in 
relation to the murder. Id. 
76 Id. at 128.  
77 Id. at 128–29. 
78 Id. 
79 See id. 
80 Id. at 130. 
81 Id.  
10
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of a regular defamation claim.82 The jury found the remaining statements 
defamatory, but not false.83 After this result favoring the respondents, Larson 
moved for judgment as a matter of law, which the district court granted in 
part.84 The district court set the jury’s verdict aside, finding the jury should 
have been allowed to consider the claims on a defamation-by-implication 
basis.85 In doing so, the district court rejected the defendants’ argument that 
the fair and accurate reporting privilege should extend to official news 
conferences.86 The court awarded Larson a new trial on all statements.87  
The respondents appealed Larson’s award of a new trial.88 The 
court of appeals reversed and reinstated judgment for respondents, finding 
that eight statements were covered by the fair and accurate reporting 
privilege.89 The court of appeals found that the district court’s “falsity” jury 
instruction appropriately directed “[the jury’s] attention on the substantial 
accuracy of the news report,” and to “construe words as a whole . . . to assess 
the meaning of each statement in context.”90 As a result, the court of appeals 
held that the jury made an adequate finding based on the given instructions, 
and reentered judgment in favor of the defendants.91 Larson appealed to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.92  
                                                           
82 Id. at 141. See infra Section III.C.2 (discussing that this was not the correct instruction and 
finding that the correct inquiry would compare the meaning of the report to the original 
statements, not examine the underlying statements).  
83 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 130. Statements one through eight, considered by the jury, 
included: 1) “Police say that man—identified as 34-year-old Ryan Larson—ambushed officer 
Decker and shot him twice—killing him”; 2) “Investigators say 34-year-old Ryan Larson 
ambushed the officer, shooting him twice. Larson is in custody”; 3) “He [Officer Decker] 
was the good guy last night going to check on someone who needed help. That someone was 
34-year-old Ryan Larson who investigators say opened fire on Officer Tom Decker for no 
reason anyone can fathom”; 4) “Investigators believe he fired two shots into Cold Spring 
Police Officer Tom Decker, causing his death”; 5) “Police say Larson is responsible for the 
shooting death of Cold Spring-Richmond Police Officer Tom Decker”; 6) “[The officer’s 
mother] holds no ill-will against the man accused of killing her son”; 7) “Ryan Larson, the 
man accused of killing Officer Decker, could be charged as early as Monday”; and 8) “Man 
faces murder charge.” Id. at 129. 
84 Id. at 130. Note, Larson did not ever request an instruction on republication liability, which 
is the umbrella doctrine for the fair and accurate report privilege and the exception to the 
common law republication rule. Id. The common law republication doctrine creates liability 
when one repeats defamatory statements made by another. See id. at 130–31. 
85 Id. at 130. This theory was dismissed at the court of appeals and supreme court. Id.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Larson v. Gannett Co., 915 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018). 
89 Id. at 500. 
90 Id. at 499. The Minnesota Supreme Court criticized this jury instruction because it requires 
the jury to consider whether the underlying substance of the statements (“that Larson killed 
Officer Decker”) was true. Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 143. 
91 Larson, 915 N.W.2d at 500.  
92 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 130. 
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C.  The Minnesota Supreme Court decision to expand the scope of the 
fair and accurate reporting privilege 
 Larson’s appeal brought an issue of first impression to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court: should the fair and accurate reporting privilege 
protect media reports on official press conferences and news releases?93 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court decided it should, holding that the fair and 
accurate reporting privilege “protects news reports that accurately and fairly 
summarize statements about a matter of public concern made by law 
enforcement officers during an official press conference and in an official 
news release.”94 Consequently, the court found that the fair and accurate 
reporting privilege could apply to seven of the statements as they “reported 
information about a matter of public concern disseminated by the law 
enforcement officers at the press conference and in the press release.”95 
However, the court found the jury instructions did not contain the relevant 
factors to determine whether the privilege was defeated.96 After establishing 
a more focused inquiry to determine whether a report is fair and accurate, 
the court remanded the case for a new trial so a jury could determine 
whether the news reports were fair and accurate, or whether the privilege 
was defeated.97  
1. Extension of Scope 
 In deciding to extend the privilege to cover official press 
conferences and press releases, the court relied on policy established in 
Moreno and First Amendment principles.98 The first value Moreno 
emphasized is that “the public interest is served by the fair and accurate 
dissemination of information concerning the events of public 
proceedings.”99 Larson involved a public news conference, so the agency 
principle was served—a person in attendance would receive the same 
                                                           
93 See id. at 131. 
94 Id. at 133. 
95 Id. at 126.  
96 Id. at 142. The district court instructed the jury using the “falsity” jury instruction regularly 
used for defamation claims. Id. This instruction inquires whether the content of the 
statement was true or false but does not determine the accuracy for which the statement was 
reported on. See id. See also infra Section III.C.2. 
97 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 126 (affirming court of appeals decision in part and reversing in 
part as to separate statements not covered by fair and accurate reporting privilege); see also 
infra Section IV.B.3.a  (describing the new test).  
98 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 131; Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 
332 (Minn 2000). 
99 See Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 132 (quoting Moreno, 610 N.W.2d at 332). 
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information that a report about the meeting described.100 While the court 
does not discuss what makes a meeting “public” in other circumstances, it 
accentuates that the purpose of the news conference at hand was to 
communicate information to the general public.101 Additionally, information 
regarding the news conference was later made available to the public.102  
While Larson argued that a summary of the news conference does 
not serve the “agency principle,”103 the court rebutted that if a proceeding is 
privileged, any fair and accurate summary of the proceeding must also be 
privileged.104 The court reasoned that the First Amendment protections and 
public interest allow the press leeway to write summaries.105 Additionally, 
this privilege may be defeated if the summaries are not an “accurate and 
complete report or a fair abridgement” of the official news conferences or 
press releases.106  
Secondly, the Larson court extended the privilege because the news 
conference and press release regarded a “matter of public concern,” similar 
to Moreno.107 Matters of public concern entail the highest amount of First 
Amendment protection.108 When public concern is at interest, the media 
must be able to quickly disseminate information from government officials 
to the public to promote public safety.109 The press’s role is not only to 
inform the public, but to increase government transparency by allowing the 
public “to assess the quality of the state and local officials’ response to a 
public safety emergency.”110 Accordingly, the Larson court reasoned that the 
media reports on a local police officer’s murder investigation regarded a 
matter of public concern.111 The court found that the media’s reports 
increased transparency and promoted accountability of the investigation.112  
                                                           
100 See id. at 133; Moreno, 610 N.W.2d at 331 (finding that a fair and accurate report serves 
the agency principle if it were to “simply relay information to the reader that she would have 
seen or heard herself were she present at the meeting.”). 
101 See Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 133. 
102 Id. at 133–34. 
103 Id. at 134. Because the agency principle serves to relay information heard at a public 
meeting, the plaintiff argued media summaries cannot “align with the privilege’s agency 
principle.” Id. 
104 Id.  
105 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975); Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 134. 
106 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 134 (quoting Moreno, 610 N.W.2d at 334). 
107 See id. (quoting Moreno, 610 N.W.2d at 331); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 611.  
108 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 134 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011)) (“Speech 
on matters of public concern ‘occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment 
values, and is entitled to special protection.’”). 
109 Id.  
110 See id. 
111 Id.  
112 Id.  
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The third reason the court extended the privilege was to protect 
reports about an “official action or proceeding.”113 The fair and accurate 
reporting privilege covers “statements made . . . during a planned, formal, 
press conference, to convey information about an ongoing criminal 
investigation of public interest, [because they] were official actions that were 
part of an official proceeding.”114 The court distinguishes that while 
statements in a formal, planned setting are privileged, other 
communications between law enforcement officers and the press may not 
be.115 In Larson, law enforcement officials organized the news conference as 
part of their official duties.116 The court reasoned this official action, done in 
furtherance of official duties, fit squarely within the definition of an official 
proceeding.117 An action or proceeding need not be “recurring” or “essential 
to democracy” to be official.118 
Furthermore, the court reasoned that because the Legislature 
included “public or official proceedings” in the state’s criminal defamation 
statute, it is reasonable to extend the privilege to public or official 
proceedings in the civil context.119 While the court was persuaded by section 
611 of the Restatement, it did not endorse the entire Restatement because 
it only incrementally advanced the privilege on these facts.120  
The court argues its ruling does not overrule Nixon.121 Nixon was 
distinguishable because it regarded reports on pleadings made by a private 
citizen about a private citizen.122 Additionally, Nixon was decided sixty years 
before the United States Supreme Court ruled on First Amendment 
                                                           
113 See id. at 135 (quoting Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 334 
(Minn 2000); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611.  
114 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 136. 
115 See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt. d, h. Comment (h) states 
that while an arrest is an official action and reports of the action are privileged, “statements 
made by the police . . . are not yet part of the judicial proceeding or of the arrest itself and 
are not privileged under this Section.” Id. The court found comment (h) irrelevant because 
it explains that when an official makes defamatory comments in addition to the proceeding 
at issue, and not as part of the proceeding, the privilege may be defeated; here, the comments 
were part of the full, official press conference. Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 136–38. 
116 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 135. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 136.  
119 Id. at 133; see MINN. STAT. § 609.765 subdiv. 3(3) (1963) (current version at MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.765 subdiv. 3(3) (2020)); see also Schuster v. U.S. News & World Rep., Inc., 459 F. 
Supp. 973, 978 (D. Minn. 1978) (arguing that Minnesota’s criminal defamation statute 
should be applied in the civil context).  
120 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 133. 
121 See id. at 136–37. 
122 Id.; compare id. at 139 (extending fair and accurate reporting privilege to cover official 
proceedings, including official press conferences and releases) with Nixon v. Dispatch 
Printing Co., 101 Minn. 309, 112 N.W. 258, 259 (1907) (holding that pleadings filed with 
the court, not yet part of judicial proceedings, are not privileged). 
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implications of defamation in Sullivan v. New York Times.123  
2. Creation of “gist” or “sting” test  
After deciding the privilege covered the press conference at issue in 
Larson, the Minnesota Supreme Court had to determine which test would 
define whether a report is fair and accurate—that is, what will defeat the 
privilege. The district court’s “falsity” jury instructions were insufficient.124 
Although the jury instruction’s substantial accuracy inquiry was relevant, it 
was not clear whether the inquiry was directed at the underlying official 
statements or whether the media’s statements were fair and accurate reports 
of the official statements.125 To correct this mistake, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court described the correct inquiry as follows. 
a. The Larson Majority 
The court established that the fair and accurate reporting privilege 
“‘is defeated by a showing that the report is not a fair and accurate report’ 
of the public proceeding.”126 Once the defendants have shown that the 
privilege covers the proceedings, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show 
the privilege has been defeated.127 A report that is fair and accurate will 
provide the same “gist” of the defamatory statements as if the reader was 
present at the proceeding.128 It cannot be edited or add contextual 
information that would be misleading.129 The report must be “substantially 
accurate.”130 While the court addressed that a report cannot add contextual 
material, it did not discuss whether adding “jocular commentary” would be 
tolerated.131 
                                                           
123 Compare Nixon, 101 Minn. at 313, 112 N.W. at 259 (1907) with New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 254 (1964).  
124 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 141. The district court found the privilege did not apply to official 
proceedings and instructed the jury on the element of “falsity,” which is an element of a 
general defamation claim. Id. at 140. The court of appeals found the “falsity” instruction was 
sufficient to instruct the jury on determining the substantial accuracy of the news report. Id. 
at 140–41. 
125 Id. at 143–44.  
126 Id. at 139 (quoting Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 333 
(Minn. 2000)). 
127 Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court remanded for a new trial on the five statements. Id. at 
145. 
128 Id. at 139–40. 
129 Id. at 139. 
130 Id.  
131 See id. at 142. But see Lee v. TMZ Prod., Inc., 710 F. Appx. 551, 559 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(finding that a report on a news conference falsey accusing the plaintiff as being involved in 
a prostitution ring was privileged because its jocular commentary did not change the 
underlying statement). 
15
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The jury instructions must frame the question so that the jury 
determines the reported statements’ fairness and accuracy compared to the 
official proceedings, and not whether the underlying official statements were 
true or false.132 The court established other guidelines, including that a fair 
and accurate report will have “the same effect on the mind of the listener or 
reader” as a person attending the press conference.133 The privilege is 
defeated if a report is edited to become misleading or is not a fair 
abridgment of the proceeding.134 Additional contextual material may defeat 
the privilege.135 The resulting inquiry, as stated by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, is: “Did the reported statements produce the same effect on the mind 
of the listener or the reader as the oral and written statements of the law 
enforcement officers at the press conference or in the press release?”136 
Because the jury instructions failed to state the applicable law, Larson is 
entitled to a new trial with the corrected jury instructions to determine 
whether the privilege was defeated for statements one through five.137  
 Minnesota’s fair and accurate reporting privilege allows the jury to 
decide whether the published reports were fair and accurate compared to 
the official proceedings, unless no reasonable jury could conclude that the 
statements were fair and accurate; then, the court must find the report is not 
fair and accurate as a matter of law.138 The correct inquiry analyzes the 
fairness and “substantial accuracy” of the report;139 the report need not be 
“exact in every immaterial detail”;140 the inquiry should address the effect on 
the mind of the reader;141 and additional comments may defeat the 
privilege.142 
                                                           
132 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 143. All defamation claims will contain underlying statements that 
are false; however, the fair and accurate report privilege intends to shield the media from 
liability for republishing false statements that others said. Id. Thus, it is imperative that the 
inquiry is whether the published statements are fair and accurate compared to the original 
statements, not whether they are false. Id. 
133 Id. at 142, 156 (quoting the adopted test from McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725, 730 
(Minn. 2013)); see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516–518 
(1991) (holding that the element of falsity in the context of defamation will overlook minor 
inaccuracies and focus on the substantial truth). 
134 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 143. 
135 Id. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 144. The court is only providing a trial on five of the original eleven statements; 
statements seven and eight are fair and accurate as a matter of law, nine through eleven were 
not capable of defamatory meaning. Id. at 130, 145.  
138 Id. at 141, 145.  
139 Id. at 142. 
140 Id.  
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 137. 
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b. The Larson Concurrence/Dissent 
The concurrence/dissent agrees with the majority that the test must 
inquire whether the meaning of the report is the same as the meaning 
communicated at the news conference.143 Justice Gildea joined Justice 
Anderson in his partial concurrence and partial dissent. The concurrence 
argues the correct inquiry is “whether respondents’ reports about the law 
enforcement press conference communicated the same meaning that 
someone who actually attended the press conference would have taken away 
from the press conference.”144 This is similar to the majority’s test, which 
analyzes whether the original and challenged statements carry the same gist 
or sting.145 However, after agreeing on the appropriate test, Justices 
Anderson and Gildea found that the report was not fair and accurate as a 
matter of law.146  
c. The aftermath of Larson 
After the Minnesota Supreme Court ruling, the respondents 
petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court on August 27, 
2020.147 The respondents argued that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
decision placed the respondents at risk of liability for defamation when a 
jury had already found the statements to be true.148 Thus, a remand was 
unnecessary because the jury assessed whether the media’s statements were 
fair and accurate.149  Respondents argued that the jury had already been 
instructed on the “falsity” inquiry—the same test the Minnesota Supreme 
Court advised on remand—and when given those instructions, found that 
the statements were substantially accurate.150 The writ was denied on 
October 13, 2020.151 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The fair and accurate reporting privilege is essential to the 
                                                           
143 Id. at 149–50 (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the 
test described by the majority while dissenting that the privilege should extend to official 
proceedings). 
144 Id. at 161.  
145 Id. at 143. 
146 See id. at 161–62; discussion infra Section IV.B.3.c. 
147 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Gannett Co., Inc., v. Larson, 940 N.W.2d 120 (2020) 
(No. 20-252), 2020 WL 5234948. 
148 Id. at *5. 
149 Id. at *4.   
150 Id. Note that the Minnesota Supreme Court, while providing similar instructions on 
remand, clarified the correct focus of the substantial accuracy test is to compare the report 
and original statements.  
151 Gannet Co., Inc. v. Larson, cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 559 (2020). 
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continued existence of the media. Without the privilege, the media would 
be subject to increased liability and litigation—a deadly combination for large 
and small news companies alike.152 The media would be just as liable for 
reports on a falsely accused person as the officers who originally issued the 
false accusation. As a result, the media would likely be chilled in its 
reporting.153 However, this privilege conflicts with the Minnesota 
Constitution, which guarantees that “[e]very person is entitled to a certain 
remedy in the laws for all injuries of wrongs which he may receive to his 
person, property or character.”154 
Attempting to balance these conflicting interests, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court extended the fair and accurate reporting privilege to cover 
reports on official news conferences and press releases regarding a matter 
of public concern.155 In expanding the scope of the privilege, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court followed precedent and was guided by widely accepted 
policy rationales.156 Additionally, the court established a test to determine 
what constitutes a fair and accurate report.157 The resulting privilege greatly 
protects the media. By tipping the scale to favor media protections, the 
resulting precedent may disrupt recovery for plaintiffs like Larson. 
A.  The scope of the privilege was correctly extended to official press 
conferences and press releases. 
 For the first time in Larson, the court expanded the fair and 
accurate reporting privilege to cover not only judicial and legislative 
proceedings, but also official press conferences and press releases presented 
by government officials regarding matters of public concern.158 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that extension of the privilege is proper 
and does not overrule precedent.159  
1. Precedent 
While Larson and the dissent argue that the majority exceeded the 
privilege’s scope as established in Nixon that protected only judicial 
                                                           
152 See Robert J. Sheran & Barbara S. Isaacman, Do We Want a Responsible Press?: A Call 
for the Creation of Self-Regulatory Mechanisms, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 48–49 (1982). 
153 Id. (“The effect . . . [of lower fault standards] on the media is . . . fewer resources . . . [for] 
their primary functions of gathering, editing, and disseminating the news . . . [making] the 
media less effective in their job of keeping the public informed.”). 
154 MINN. CONST. art. 1 § 8. 
155 Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 133 (Minn. 2020). 
156 Id. at 133, 138. 
157 Id. at 133. 
158 See id. at 132. 
159 Id. 
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proceedings,160 this argument fails to account for constitutional free speech 
developments over the past eighty years. Additionally, the Larson decision 
minimally expands upon the privilege’s scope established in Moreno, which 
has been upheld.161   
The combined concurrence and dissent argues that the court’s 
extension of the scope oversteps precedent, relying entirely on Nixon.162 
Nixon was the first Minnesota case to recognize the fair and accurate 
reporting privilege by distinguishing that judicial proceedings are privileged 
whereas pleadings are not.163 Pleadings were excluded from the privilege in 
1907 because they had not yet reached the court and did not allow both 
sides to be heard, thus they were not considered judicial.164 At that time, 
professional rules against frivolous complaints did not exist; thus, privileging 
complaints would allow anyone to amplify defamatory statements in the 
newspaper by merely filing a complaint.165 Since Nixon, procedural 
safeguards against frivolous complaints now prevent such a scenario from 
occurring.166 While Nixon was appropriately decided in its time, the climate 
surrounding free speech has changed.167  
Thus, when deciding to extend the privilege in Moreno for the first 
time since Nixon, the court was responding to over eighty years of 
constitutional free speech development in which speech—especially speech 
regarding matters of public concern and government happenings—had great 
protection. In Moreno, the court avoided overruling Nixon and extended 
the fair and accurate reporting privilege to cover reports of regular business 
in public city council meetings.168 This extension was the springboard for 
extending the privilege again in Larson.  
Speech about public officials and official government acts is more 
protected than speech about private citizens.169 As a result, those that publish 
public officials’ speech should be more protected than those who publish 
                                                           
160 See id. at 136, 152. 
161 See id. at 132–33 (referencing the two principles on which the Moreno decision was based 
as well as the court’s decision to uphold Moreno and apply the privileges protection in this 
case). 
162 Id. at 148. 
163 Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co., 101 Minn. 309, 313, 112 N.W. 258, 259 (1907).  
164 See id. 
165 See Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 137. 
166 MINN. R. CIV. P. 11.02 (requiring presentations to the court to be made in good faith). 
167 See supra Section II.B.  
168 See Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 333 (Minn. 2000). 
169 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (“Public officials and public 
figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication 
and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private 
individuals normally enjoy.”). 
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private citizens’ speech.170 However, the court before Larson only extended 
the privilege to publishers of private speech.171 It would be inconsistent with 
defamation precedent to deny the same privilege and liability protections to 
publishers of public officials’ speech—a category of speech that is more 
protected.172 For example, if the court did not extend the privilege, 
journalists reporting on law enforcement statements at a stand-alone press 
conference discussing a killer-at-large would not be protected, but reporting 
on a private citizen’s haphazard speech discussing the same issue at a 
scheduled city council meeting would be protected.173 If the Larson court 
did not extend the privilege’s scope, the privilege’s application would be 
inconsistent. 
Larson and the concurrence/dissent also argued that the privilege 
conflicts with Nixon.174 However, Nixon did not discuss the privilege’s scope 
beyond judicial proceedings.175 Nixon privileged judicial proceedings 
because they entailed a fair hearing that a judge had some control over.176 
For the same reasons, the privilege did not protect pleadings as they could 
be frivolous and without merit.177 This distinction was necessary because 
Nixon involved a private party attempting to defame another private party 
in pleadings.178 In addition, protecting pleadings “can in no manner serve 
the administration of justice, or any other legitimate object of public 
interest.”179 Entirely different than Nixon’s private pleadings, Larson 
involves a public official’s statement on an investigation of public concern.180 
Additionally, a legitimate purpose of public interest is served by protecting 
media reports about official law enforcement statements regarding a 
                                                           
170 Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 260 (1964) (barring liability for 
press comments about public officials without proof of malice) with Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 
(“Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in 
protecting them is correspondingly greater.”). The publishers of public officials’ speech 
should have more protection than the publishers of private individuals’ speech.  
171 See Moreno, 610 N.W.2d at 333 (holding the privilege extended to a private individual 
speaking at a city council meeting).  
172 See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344; see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 260 (distinguishing between 
categories of public versus private individuals).  
173 Brief of Amicus Curiae Star Trib. Media Co., LLC, Associated Press, Fox/UTV Holdings, 
LLC, ex rel. KMSP Fox 9, the Minn. Newspaper Ass’n & Rep. Comm. for Freedom of Press 
at 10, Larson v. Gannett Co., 915 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018) (No. A17-1068), 2017 
WL 10752201 [hereinafter Brief for Amici]. 
174 Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 136 (Minn. 2020). 
175 Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co., 101 Minn. 309, 312, 112 N.W. 258, 259 (1907). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 313, 259. 
179 Id. 
180 See generally Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 134 (Minn. 2020) (referring to the 
publicly held press conference and press release involving the “slaying of a community police 
officer”). 
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suspected murderer at an official news conference.181 The extension of the 
privilege’s scope in Larson does not overrule Nixon, but clarifies an area 
not previously considered.182 
Larson and the concurrence/dissent’s argument that the privilege, 
if applied to official proceedings, must be limited to reports on arrests only 
after commencing judicial actions would contradict the Moreno decision.183 
Moreno privileged speech that accused a private citizen of criminal activity 
before any charges were filed.184 The privilege’s scope would be inconsistent 
if limited to reports only after a formal criminal charge commenced. And 
with uncertainty, media speech would be chilled.185 Larson correctly 
expanded upon the Moreno framework by privileging reports on official 
proceedings before judicial action commences. 
The expansion of the privilege’s scope accords with Minnesota 
precedent. Additionally, this expansion to official proceedings is consistent 
with section 611 of the Restatement,186 and rulings in jurisdictions outside of 
Minnesota, including a case upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.187 
2. Policy of extending the privilege 
Three policy theories support extending the fair and accurate 
reporting privilege to official proceedings regarding matters of public 
concern; agency, public interest in important matters, and public as 
supervisors.188 First, the media acts as government agents when it amplifies 
                                                           
181 See id. at 136. 
182 See id.; see also Nixon, 101 Minn. at 309, 112 N.W. at 258. 
183 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 138. 
184 Id. at 137 (finding that Nixon and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt. h 
support this reasoning). 
185 See Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868, 875 (Minn. 2019) (“Courts 
cannot offer recourse for injury to reputation at the cost of chilling speech on matters of 
public concern.”); see also Wynn v. Smith, 16 P.3d 424, 430 (Nev. 2001) (“The purpose of 
this exception is to obviate any chilling effect on the reporting of statements already accessible 
to the public.”). 
186 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (AM. LAW INST. 1975) (“The publication of 
defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a 
meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the 
report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.”). 
187 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 287 (1971) (privileging an official government 
organization’s report); see also Jones v. Taibbi, 512 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 1987) (extending 
privilege to official statements by police departments); Wright v. Grove Sun Newspaper Co., 
873 P.2d 983, 990 (Okla. 1994) (privileging a press conference held by an investigator 
because it is within the official duties of an officer). 
188 See generally Paul Brock Bech, Isolating the Marketplace of Ideas from the World: Lee 
v. Dong-A Ilbo and the Fair Report Privilege, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1153, 1159 (1989) 
(describing agency, supervisory, and informational rationales to be the most widely used 
explanations for the privilege); see also Cox & Callaghan, supra note 10, at 27; 4 Minn. Prac., 
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official government messages that the public would hear if attending the 
proceeding.189 Second, the media holds government officials accountable by 
exposing their actions to allow scrutiny of government policies and 
corresponding activities.190 The fair and accurate reporting privilege “reflects 
the judgment that the[re is a] need, in a self-governing society, for free-
flowing information about matters of public interest.”191 Third, the public 
has an interest and a right to be informed about matters of public concern.192 
The public will benefit by expanding the privilege in Minnesota to protect 
media while reporting on official news conferences by public officials.  
a. The “Agency” Rationale 
The simplest supporting rationale for the fair and accurate 
reporting privilege’s extension is that the media can only report what the 
public would have heard if attending the official meeting themselves.193 
However, citizens are busy, and “in a society in which each individual has 
but limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand the 
operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring 
to him in convenient form the facts of those operations.”194 Just as the public 
does not have the time to observe, local law enforcement agencies do not 
have the platform to disseminate information as quickly and productively as 
the media.195 Consequently, the media is best situated to report on official 
government proceedings.196 
However, some argue that the media may amplify government 
speech which may not be widely known without the media’s help.197 If the 
media did not amplify the government’s speech, the speech would remain 
in the time and place in which it was originally spoken.198 As a result, when 
the government happens to make defamatory statements, the person’s 
injured reputation would not be as widespread but for the media’s 
amplification. 
The impact that greater liability would have on the media outweighs 
this concern. If the media was not privileged to report on official 
                                                           
Jury Instr. Guides—Civil, CIVJIG 50.31 (6th ed. 2014) (citing agency and public interest in 
public affairs, but not the public as supervisors, as the basis for the privilege). 
189 Cox & Callaghan, supra note 10, at 30–31. 
190 Id. at 31. 
191 Lee v. TMZ Prods., Inc., 710 F. App’x 551, 557 (3d Cir. 2017).   
192 Bech, supra note 188, at 1160. 
193 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1975); see also 4 
Minn. Prac., Jury Instr. Guides—Civil, CIVJIG 50.31 (6th ed. 2014). 
194 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975). 
195 Id. 
196 See id. 
197 Bech, supra note 188, at 1159. 
198 Id.  
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government statements, the media could be chilled.199 Media organizations 
would either be cautious in their reporting or not report on public officials 
at all if they could be liable for merely republishing statements that public 
officials spoke—statements the media had no control over—which were later 
found defamatory. This implication would be unfair; as the old saying goes, 
“don’t shoot the messenger.”200 Saving the media from the bullets of liability, 
especially when they are solely amplifying speech by public officials on 
matters of public concern, greatly benefits our society.  
b. Public interest in matters of public concern 
The public has a right to know about information shared at official 
government proceedings.201 If the media is not privileged when reporting on 
such proceedings, they may hold back on reporting vital news or safety 
concerns because of the extreme liability risk.202 
The media coverage of George Floyd’s death in May 2020 
exemplifies the need for this privilege to cover official government 
proceedings. As information regarding protests, riots, and escalated 
situations changed, the media quickly and succinctly distilled the important 
headlines from news conferences to benefit public safety.203 Because of the 
public and viral nature of the riots, police collected video footage to help 
identify rioters, which created conditions ripe for false information to 
quickly spread. For example, an individual dubbed the “Umbrella Man” 
was videoed nonchalantly breaking AutoZone windows and falsely named 
as a St. Paul police officer on social media channels.204 The St. Paul police 
department issued a press release clearing the falsely accused police officer’s 
                                                           
199 See, e.g., Wynn v. Smith, 16 P.3d 424, 430 (Nev. 2001) (“The purpose of this exception 
is to obviate any chilling effect on the reporting of statements already accessible to the 
public.”). 
200 See generally Shooting the Messenger and Don’t Shoot the Messenger, GRAMMARIST, 
https://grammarist.com/idiom/shooting-the-messenger-and-dont-shoot-the-messenger/ 
[https://perma.cc/G6W9-VEZN].  
201 See 4 Minn. Prac., Jury Instr. Guides—Civil, CIVJIG 50.31 (6th ed. 2014); see also Bech, 
supra note 188, at 1160.  
202 See Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 333 (Minn. 2000). 
203 Emily Haavik, Estefan Saucedo & Bill Strande, ‘Very few incidents’ reported Sunday 
Night, Police Warn There are Still ‘Outside Agitators’ in Twin Cities, KARE 11 (June 1, 
2020), https://www.kare11.com/article/news/local/george-floyd/george-floyd-protests-
minneapolis-st-paul-day-six/89-0450ec60-6d6f-4472-a306-8b066cbd0fc8 
[https://perma.cc/A7WH-EBF6] (reporting on Governor Walz’s news conference where the 
Department of Corrections Commissioner discussed the investigation of a semi-truck driver 
that drove into a crowd of protesters). 
204 Jaclyn Peiser, ‘Umbrella Man’ went Viral Breaking Windows at a Protest. He was a White 
Supremacist Trying to Spark Violence, Police Say, WASH. POST, (July 29, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/29/umbrella-man-white-supremacist-
minneapolis/ [https://perma.cc/NPZ4-H5JR].  
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name, which was quickly amplified by the media.205 And with the fair and 
accurate report privilege, if the police wrongly identified a rioter, the media 
would still be shielded from liability even if they shared the official 
statement. Regardless of what was reported, the media’s role in quickly 
amplifying important information regarding public safety is vital in volatile 
situations such as these. 
If local media sources were chilled and stopped reporting on 
official government proceedings like press releases and news conferences, 
people could be without up-to-date news, and others may turn to less 
reliable, unregulated social media sources—furthering the spread of 
disinformation.206 In the Twin Cities, the public benefitted from media 
reports on official news conferences during a time of unrest, just as in 
Larson, the public benefitted from reports on the murder investigation. 
Without the fair and accurate reporting privilege, the media’s role in 
amplifying official updates of public concern may not be as effective. 
c. Public as supervisors 
Keeping the public informed about public officials and public 
affairs has long been another reason to support the privilege and First 
Amendment speech in general.207 After all, “there is practically universal 
agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect 
the free discussion of governmental affairs.”208 The media is a tool to help 
keep government officials responsible to the public.209 The media’s news 
reports on government proceedings not only promote communication 
between officials and the public, but “allow the public to assess the quality 
of the state and local officials’ response to a public safety emergency.”210 
Extending this privilege to cover reports on official government proceedings 
will promote the transparency and accountability of government actors.  
                                                           
205 Surveillance Video Confirms that Saint Paul Police Officer Jacob Pederson is not 
‘Umbrella Man’, CITY OF SAINT PAUL, (June 8, 2020), 
https://www.stpaul.gov/news/surveillance-video-confirms-saint-paul-police-officer-jacob-
pederson-not-%E2%80%98umbrella-man%E2%80%99 [https://perma.cc/TX8J-QMMG]; 
John Shipley, St. Paul Police: Video Shows Officer isn’t ‘Umbrella Man’,  PIONEER PRESS, 
(June 8, 2020), https://www.twincities.com/2020/06/08/umbrella-man-st-paul-police-officer-
george-floyd-minneapolis/ [https://perma.cc/PLF3-Q62P] (noting that this article was 
released on the same day of the St. Paul press release).  
206 George Floyd protests: Misleading Footage and Conspiracy Theories Spread Online, BBC 
NEWS, (June 2, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/52877751 [https://perma.cc/9AH3-
DA3H]. 
207 Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 133 (Minn. 2020) (quoting Moreno, 610 N.W.2d 
at 331); see also Bech, supra note 188, at 1178.  
208 Mills v. State of Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). 
209 Id. at 219. 
210 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 134. 
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This rationale has not yet been endorsed by the Minnesota Practice 
Series as a basis for the privilege.211 However, after recent civil unrest, this 
rationale may provide another perspective to this privilege’s importance. 
Today, the media’s role in keeping law enforcement accountable has never 
been more important. Even before the killing of George Floyd on May 25, 
2020, the amici predicted a situation in which the Black Lives Matter 
movement would benefit because the media was afforded a privilege to 
unveil corrupt police procedures and amplify the reports.212 “[T]he law of 
this State should incentivize the media to serve as a check on police—to bring 
their activities out of the shadows and into the sunlight—especially during 
that time period when there is no check in the form of judicial oversight.”213 
To ensure future law enforcement actions are transparent, the media must 
be able to report on official law enforcement statements and proceedings 
without liability.214 Furthermore, the media’s role is vital before judicial 
intervention occurs to privilege not just judicial or legislative proceedings, 
but official news conferences and press releases as well. As the amici point 
out, significant corrupt government activity may occur before judicial 
oversight begins.215  
Thus, the court’s extension of the fair and accurate reporting 
privilege to official news conferences and press releases which regard a 
matter of public concern is supported by Minnesota precedent and well-
known policy rationales.216 This advance is incremental and may only apply 
to public proceedings with official government speech.217 The Larson court 
clarified that this privilege will not adhere to “unofficial police comments 
that are not a part of an official meeting or statement by law enforcement.”218 
To determine whether a proceeding is privileged, it must be public, regard 
a matter of public concern, and be organized by an official in his or her 
official duties.219 In Minnesota, this privilege now extends to judicial 
proceedings and official legislative proceedings, including private citizen 
speech at city council meetings, as well as official news conferences and 
                                                           
211 See generally 4 Minn. Prac., Jury Instr. Guides—Civil, CIVJIG 50.31 (6th ed. 2014) (citing 
agency and public interest in public affairs as the base for the privilege). 
212 See Brief for Amici, supra note 173, at 22. 
213 Id. at 22–23. 
214 Cox & Callaghan, supra note 10, at 27–28 (“Hamilton's reasoning echoes a 
commonsensical basis for the privilege: ‘if the press, fearful of libel suits, failed to report on 
the judiciary and the proceedings leading up to judicial decisions, the public would not have 
an ongoing, comprehensive view of the system, and thus one of the very tools necessary for 
a self-governing society would be lost.’”). 
215 See Brief for Amici, supra note 173, at 22.  
216 Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 136 (Minn. 2020). 
217 Id. at 133.  
218 Id. at n.12. 
219 Id. at 133–35. 
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press releases regarding a matter of public concern.220  
B.  The test established may favor media protection over an individual’s 
right to recover.    
While privileging official government proceedings raises concerns 
of overly protecting the media, the privilege does have boundaries. This 
Section analyzes those boundaries by examining how the majority created a 
test that balances conflicting interests, how other jurisdictions have 
determined whether a report is fair and accurate, and the implications of 
this test’s application to the Larson facts. A jury verdict could either help 
create clear standards for the limits of this privilege, or could instead destroy 
the ability for a plaintiff to recover for a damaged reputation. 
1. Conflicting interests 
 Before addressing the test’s limits, the conflict between the 
media’s ability to report on government proceedings and the plaintiff’s 
ability to recover when the media does not fairly report on those 
proceedings must be acknowledged. As Gertz established in the defamation 
context, “[s]ome tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous 
and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful 
injury.”221 
a. Right for media to speak 
American citizens, including media organizations, have a First 
Amendment right to free speech, especially when the speech relates to 
matters of public concern.222 The fair and accurate reporting privilege 
advances this First Amendment right by ensuring the media is not liable for 
repeating other’s defamatory statements. However, if the media is unfairly 
held liable for their publications on government speech, the media may be 
chilled in their reporting.  
Thus, in endorsing the fair and accurate reporting privilege, the 
majority embraced the right to and importance of media speech. Moreover, 
the majority’s test, which requires the report to communicate the same 
message as the original statement, provides a broad cushion for the media, 
                                                           
220 See Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co., 101 Minn. 309, 313, 112 N.W. 258, 259 (1907); 
Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 333 (Minn. 2000); Larson, 940 
N.W.2d at 136. 
221 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
222 U.S. CONST. amend. I. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 
(1964). 
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similar to other jurisdictions.223  
b. Right for individuals to recover 
However, on the other side of the scale, a private individual’s right 
to recover for a tarnished reputation is “highly worthy of protection.” 224 
Private individuals are often more vulnerable to tarnished reputations as 
they cannot easily rebut false statements.225 Justice Anderson also recognized 
that “the Minnesota Constitution specifically promises the residents of 
Minnesota the right to a remedy in our courts for damage to character.”226 
As a result, any expansion of this privilege could deprive a plaintiff, 
like Larson, of his or her state constitutional right to recover for damage to 
his or her character.227 If the boundary of what constitutes a fair and accurate 
report is too great, individuals may be unable to recover from media 
companies for such damage.228 Additionally, if given a broad scope of 
interpretation without liability, disinformation may run amok.229 
2. General survey of the fair and accurate reporting privilege test in 
other jurisdictions 
Jurisdictions have used part, or all, of section 611 of the 
Restatement to influence their fair and accurate reporting privilege.230 
Generally, “the publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a 
report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public 
that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is 
accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.”231  
However, the limits of this common law privilege are not consistent 
across jurisdictions. The following Section will broadly describe the 
                                                           
223 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
224 Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868, 875 (quoting Jadwin v. Minneapolis 
Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 491 (Minn. 1985)).  
225 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
226 Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 149 (Minn. 2020) (Anderson, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). 
227 Id. 
228 See id.; see also Hartzog v. United Press Ass’ns., 202 F.2d 81, 83 (4th Cir. 1953) (holding 
that defamatory statements that summarize events inaccurately are actionable). 
229 See infra Section IV.B.3.b.2 
230 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (noting that neither the 
State Supreme Court or Appellate Court in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, D.C., Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia 
has referenced § 611 in case opinions). 
231 Id. 
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privilege’s nuances and its accompanying test. 
a. Who should decide whether the report is fair and accurate? 
Many courts are in consensus that after a defendant has shown the 
privilege applies to their publication, a jury may be required to determine 
the factual question of whether the published content is fair and accurate.232 
The Fifth Circuit has stated that it is not proper for the court to determine 
whether the fair and accurate reporting privilege applies when there exists 
more than one conclusion; it is instead a question for a jury.233 Placing the 
responsibility on the jury is necessary because of the extensive fact inquiry.234  
However, courts will take the decision away from a jury if no 
reasonable jury could decide a report was unfair and inaccurate.235 The 
Ninth Circuit upheld a district court summary judgment decision that found 
a report was fair and accurate as a matter of law.236 In finding a report both 
fair and accurate as a matter of law, the court protected the press from 
unnecessary litigation, finding that “speedy resolution of cases involving free 
speech is desirable” so that First Amendment rights are not chilled.237 Other 
California courts have held the fair and true inquiry may be a matter of law 
if there is no dispute as to the material facts.238 
Additionally, the First Circuit determined that whether a report is 
fair and accurate is a matter of law and may be determined by the judge.239 
In these cases, the court found the privilege had been abused, and the 
reports were unfair and inaccurate as a matter of law.240 
                                                           
232 See SMOLLA, supra note 13, at § 6:83. 
233 Id. (discussing reversal of summary judgment in Doe v. Doe, 941 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1991) 
where an author made an allegation that Dr. DiLeo had played a part in Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s assassination based on a legislative report); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 619, cmt. b (1977). 
234 See Doe, 941 F.2d 280 (addressing whether the fair and accurate reporting privilege was 
abused: “abuse issues are indeed jury questions, so long as the facts admit of more than one 
conclusion”); see also Levine v. CMP Publications, Inc., 738 F.2d 660, 668 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(“Where the evidence presents a conflict about whether the published statement is a 
substantially true account of what was said in the public proceeding or whether the ordinary 
reader would construe the statement as such an account, then the jury must resolve these 
issues.”). 
235 See Dorsey v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 973 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1992). 
236 Id. 
237 Id. (quoting Good Gov’t Grp. of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 572, 578 
(Cal. 1978).  
238 Id. at 1435–36. 
239 See, e.g., Howell v. Enter. Publ’g Co., 920 N.E.2d 1, 21 (Mass. 2010); see also Barhoum 
v. NYP Holdings, Inc., No. 126711, 2014 Mass. Super. LEXIS 52, at *26 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 7, 2014).  
240 Howell, 920 N.E.2d at 23; Barhoum, No. 126711, 2014 LEXIS 52, at *26.  
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b. What is the test to determine whether a report is fair and accurate?  
The fair and accurate reporting privilege, adopted most often as a 
qualified privilege, can be defeated by showing that the report was not a fair 
and accurate summary of the proceeding.241 While some courts blended 
these terms into one test, others attempted to create two separate inquiries.242 
To determine whether an article is a fair and accurate abridgement 
of the original proceedings, some courts describe the inquiry as a “gist” or 
“sting” test.243 This test inquires whether a reader would find an article carries 
materially greater “sting” than the original proceeding.244 The test does not 
require that an official proceeding be repeated in the exact manner it was 
presented; it allows the media a “certain amount of literary license.”245 In 
allowing the media a “degree of flexibility,” they are not required to justify 
every word choice as long as the report’s substance is accurately delivered.246 
However, the degree of flexibility is up for interpretation—it remains a 
factual inquiry to determine what will make a report substantially harsher, 
or change the meaning so that a reader is impressed with a different “gist.”247 
The Restatement emphasizes that a report must not only be 
accurate, but fair.248 This bifurcated approach influenced some courts to 
consider each prong separately.249 It is unclear if this provides a substantially 
different outcome. 
c. Does additional context defeat the fair and accurate reporting 
privilege?  
The Restatement cautions that a reporter cannot “make additions 
of his own that would convey a defamatory impression.”250 Some courts 
explain that the privilege is forfeited “by making exaggerated additions, or 
                                                           
241 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 300 (2020); see also Cox & Callaghan, supra note 10, 
at 36. 
242 Compare Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 143 (Minn. 2020) (“Did the reported 
statements produce the same effect on the mind of the listener . . . ?”) with Howell, 920 
N.E.2d at 22 (“[I]s the report sufficiently factually incorrect or sufficiently mischaracterized 
that the impression on the reader is so unfair to the plaintiff as to warrant placing it outside 
the privilege?”) (emphasis added). 
243 See Dorsey v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 973 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1992). 
244 Id. 
245 Id.  
246 Id. (quoting McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 234 Cal. Rptr. 702, 711 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1987)). 
247 Id. 
248 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1975). 
249 See Howell v. Enter. Publ’g Co., 920 N.E.2d 1, 21 (Mass. 2010). 
250 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt. f (AM. LAW. INST. 1975). 
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embellishments to the account.”251 While a report may phrase the title to 
attract attention, the media cannot place an inaccurate spin on the 
proceedings.252 Neither will the report be privileged if the report becomes a 
one-sided interview or investigation headed by the media.253 
Nonetheless, a dramatic tone does not necessarily mean the report 
is unfair or inaccurate.  The Third Circuit ruled in favor of a news outlet 
that added jocular commentary while reporting on a news conference that 
wrongly accused a plaintiff of involvement with a prostitution ring.254 The 
report was privileged because the “defamatory sting” of the news conference 
was the same as the report: the article conveyed the same information as 
someone who would have attended the press conference.255 The court found 
that a distasteful or insulting tone will not defeat the privilege as long as the 
underlying facts remain the same.256  
3. The implications of the fair and accurate test established in Larson  
 The Minnesota Supreme Court did not stray too far from other 
jurisdictions’ treatment of the privilege and its limits. However, based on 
these facts, a jury’s interpretation of these instructions is imperative to 
maintain the correct balance between the media’s right to speak and the 
individual’s right to recover. In this Section, the majority’s test will be 
applied to Larson’s facts to understand whether it strikes the proper balance. 
a. Application of the test: did the court get it right? 
If a jury was presented with the majority’s test on remand, the 
inquiry would be whether the additional context provided by the media had 
created a harsher “gist” than law enforcement officers actual statements.257 
                                                           
251 Pellegrino Food Prod. Co. v. Valley Voice, 875 A.2d 1161, 1165 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) 
(citing DeMary v. Latrobe Printing & Publishing Co., 762 A.2d 758, 762 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000)) (noting the privilege was defeated because the author had embellished impressions 
she received during a meeting). 
252 Alan v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 973 So. 2d 1177, 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) 
(holding that although some of the information was phrased to catch readership’s attention, 
it was still fair and accurate). 
253 Tharp v. Media Gen., Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 673, 687 (D.S.C. 2013) (finding that a report 
was not substantially true when the media did not base their report on the public record of 
the plaintiff’s arrest, but instead conducted their own interview and went beyond the facts 
that could have been gleaned from the press release). 
254 Lee v. TMZ Prods. Inc., 710 F. App’x 551, 559 (3d Cir. 2017). The news outlet reported 
on the Attorney General’s press release stating Lee had been arrested and accused of 
involvement with a prostitution ring which was an accurate summary, although it was later 
found the plaintiff had been wrongly arrested. Id. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 See 4 Minn. Prac., Jury Instr. Guides—Civil, CIVJIG 50.31 (6th ed. 2014). 
30
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 7
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss3/7
2021] SACRIFICING RECOVERY FOR MEDIA PROTECTION 1159 
While, as the majority resounds, a reasonable juror could construe that the 
media’s additional contextual material creates a harsher “gist” and destroy 
the privilege, a reasonable juror should find that the media’s additional 
contextual material changed the meaning of the original news conference 
statements.258 The media’s reports created a substantially harsher “gist” than 
what a person attending the press conference would have heard.259 
While KARE 11 and the St. Cloud Times did report the same 
underlying message—that Larson had been taken into custody in connection 
with the murder—they added additional context.260 For example: 
Police say that man—identified as 34-year-old Ryan 
Larson—ambushed officer Decker and shot him twice—
killing him. . . . He [Officer Decker] was the good guy last 
night going to check on someone who needed help. That 
someone was 34-year-old Ryan Larson who investigators 
say opened fire on Officer Tom Decker for no reason 
anyone can fathom.261  
This statement was based on the press conference and release in which law 
enforcement officers repeatedly emphasized the early and ongoing nature 
of the investigation.262 At the press conference, a deputy stated that Larson, 
the subject of a welfare check, had been taken into custody; however, 
“[Larson] was interviewed . . . and some of that investigation is still 
ongoing.”263 When asked whether Larson was the shooter, the representative 
refused to acknowledge that Larson was involved with the shooting and 
again made clear that the investigation was still ongoing, so the officers could 
not comment on that matter.264 
A viewer of the KARE 11 news report or a reader of the St. Cloud 
Times would have gathered that the police arrested Larson for ambushing, 
shooting, and killing a police officer—when in fact, the law enforcement 
officers said no such thing.265 They only indicated that Larson was arrested 
as a suspect, the investigation was early and ongoing, and they were 
continuing to follow up on all other leads.266 However, Larson’s reputation 
was destroyed because of the media’s intense focus on him as the only 
suspected murderer, despite his later exoneration as a suspect.267 While the 
                                                           
258 Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 145 (Minn. 2020). 
259 See id. at 161–62 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
260 See id. at 128. 
261 Id. (emphasis added).  
262 Id. at 158–59 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This language was 
vocalized no fewer than thirteen times during the press conference. Id. 
263 Id. 
264 Id.  
265 Id. at 161. 
266 Id.  
267 See id. at 126–29. While no one had ever been arrested for the killing, another person of 
interest had committed suicide after police officers questioned him. Id. 
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majority correctly found that statements six through eight did not convey 
defamatory meaning or were non-actionable opinion, statements one 
through five provide a much different effect on the mind of a viewer/reader 
than what a person would have understood from the news conference.  
b. On remand 
The Minnesota Supreme Court remanded the case to the district 
court to decide whether the privilege was defeated with this inquiry: “Did 
the reported statements produce the same effect on the mind of the listener 
or the reader as the oral and written statements of the law enforcement 
officers at the press conference or in the press release?”268 The court found 
that a remand was necessary because, first, the instructions provided at 
district court were incorrect,269 and second, a reasonable juror could find that 
the reports were unfair and inaccurate reports of the news conferences or 
press releases.270 The majority practiced judicial restraint and sent the case 
back to a jury on remand.271 The following Section will predict the impacts 
of this decision. 
1. A verdict for Larson 
Justice Anderson, in dissent, argues that the news broadcasts and 
articles “did not communicate the same meaning as the press conference as 
a matter of law,” because the reports projected a meaning of finality, whereas 
the press conference emphasized the early stages of the investigation.272 
While the majority did not engage in this analysis, it is very possible that a 
jury could find that the reports and original proceedings did not convey the 
same meaning.  
A verdict in favor of Larson would establish clear boundaries of the 
fair and accurate reporting privilege in Minnesota that do not yet exist.273 
                                                           
268 Id. at 148.  
269 See id. at 139. The jury was given instructions on “falsity,” which asked whether the 
statements were substantially accurate. Because these instructions did not specify whether 
the inquiry was to the underlying statements or to the report compared to the original 
statements, the majority finds the instructions were inaccurate. See id. 
270 Id. at 141. 
271 Id. at 148. 
272 Id. at 161 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Because Justice Anderson 
finds an individual’s right to recover for damage to personal reputation to be so compelling, 
he would take the question from the jury and find the statements false as a matter of law and 
the defendants liable for negligence damages. Id. 
273 See, e.g., Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 334 (Minn. 2000). 
This case, one of the only other modern decisions regarding the fair and accurate report 
privilege in Minnesota, did not have enough of a record to determine whether the privilege 
was defeated. 
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Thus, a verdict for Larson would establish that on these facts, additional 
context changed the meaning of a report and defeated the fair and accurate 
reporting privilege. Additionally, Larson would be compensated for the 
damages to his reputation, and the importance of an individual’s right to 
recover for defamation in Minnesota would be bolstered.274 
2. A verdict for respondents 
However, if on remand, the jury found the statements to be fair and 
accurate reports of the original proceedings, broad media protections may 
result and disfavor an individual’s right to recover for a damaged reputation. 
The change in meaning from the original proceeding to the media reports, 
in this case, would set a standard for the media’s ability to report on future 
proceedings with flair. It could open the door to broad interpretations of 
what is fair and accurate and steamroll not only Larson’s, but future 
individual’s reputations. Providing the media with a broad interpretative 
lens may lead to disinformation or “fake news.”275  
Justice Anderson emphasizes the need for a “free and robust press 
that is motivated to inform and educate the public about important public 
matters” while recognizing that the media must be responsible in their 
work.276 And in an era of fake news, holding the media accountable for 
reporting disinformation, disguised as government news, is a commendable 
goal.277 In this context especially, when the media is held out as amplifying 
government speech, there is a heightened need to hold media companies 
liable if their reporting is not fair and accurate. Additionally, when the 
statements concern a private individual, the media must report even more 
fairly and accurately because private individuals are not able to easily 
recover.278 There is much at stake in this case if a jury were to find statements 
                                                           
274 See Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 148–49 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(emphasizing the importance of an individual’s right to recover for damage to personal 
reputation). 
275 David O. Klein & Joshua R. Wueller, Fake News: A Legal Perspective, 20 J. INTERNET 
L., Apr. 2017, at 6 (defining “fake news” as “online publication of intentionally or knowingly 
false statements of facts.”). However, under this definition, the privilege could be defeated 
because the statements were made knowingly to be intentionally false.  
276 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 161 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  
277 See Björnstjern Baade, Don’t Call a Spade a Shovel – Crucial Subtleties in the Definition 
of Fake News and Disinformation, VERFASSUNGSBLOG, (Apr. 14, 2020), 
https://verfassungsblog.de/dont-call-a-spade-a-shovel/ [https://perma.cc/XFA6-2M8Q] 
(“[F]ake news or disinformation can also encompass distorted statements, which are in 
themselves factually correct, but presented in a way that makes it likely that false conclusions 
are drawn from them.”). 
278 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Address: Fake News, Weaponized Defamation and the 
First Amendment, 47 SW. L. REV. 291, 292 (2018) (“When it comes to reputation, a person 
who has been tarnished by false speech, may never be able to regain the lost reputation, 
setting the record straight usually fails to eliminate the tarnish.”); see also Larson, 940 
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one through five to be fair and accurate. 
c. Was there a better way?  
While the Minnesota Supreme Court practiced judicial restraint in 
sending the determination of a fair and accurate report back to district court, 
there is much at risk if a jury found this to be a fair and accurate report. 
Moreover, if the case were to be settled out of court, the State of Minnesota 
would, again, be left without clear boundaries of what types of facts 
constitute a fair and accurate report.279 
The court could have engaged in Justice Anderson’s analysis to 
decide the case as a matter of law.280 This decision would be beneficial for 
Larson and could create workable boundaries of the privilege to hold the 
media accountable in Minnesota. In Massachusetts, the court decides 
whether a report is fair and accurate as a matter of law, finding that the 
privilege is already very generous.281 While this is usually a fact-intensive 
inquiry, the record is clear on these facts, and without other precedent as to 
how this privilege is applied in Minnesota,282 the jury may not understand 
how “fair” and “accurate” are applied in practice. On the one hand, if the 
court were to instead decide this case as a matter of law, a clearer picture of 
the privilege’s limits would exist. On the other hand, in remanding back to 
a jury, the court has followed its precedent and maintained judicial 
restraint.283  
                                                           
N.W.2d at 156 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). As Justice Anderson 
recognized, an individual’s right to recover for defamatory statements which tarnish their 
reputation is incredibly important. 
279 While the court did decide that statements seven and eight were fair and accurate as a 
matter of law, the statements at issue—those that added additional context—are much more 
telling of how much flexibility the media may have in their reports. Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 
160 (Anderson, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
280 See id. at 161. Justice Anderson stated, “[w]e have decided questions of falsity as a matter 
of law where the content of an alleged defamatory statement and an actual statement is 
undisputed,” and proceeded to find that because statements one through eight 
communicated a meaning of finality, the statements should be found not fair and accurate as 
a matter of law. Id. 
281 See Barhoum v. NYP Holdings, Inc., No. 126711, 2014 LEXIS 52, at *9 (Mass. Mar. 7, 
2014). Investigators circulated an e-mail to the press asking for more information about two 
suspects in relation to the Boston Marathon bombing. A corresponding news article gave the 
impression that the two suspects were guilty and the court determined it was, as a matter of 
law, not a fair and accurate report. A settlement followed this decision. See also Howell v. 
Enter. Publ’g Co., 920 N.E.2d 1, 21 (Mass. 2010) (noting that the standard is generous and 
requires judge to decide whether privilege attaches). 
282 See Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 334 (Minn. 2000) 
(holding that while city council meeting is within the privilege’s scope, there was not enough 
of a record to determine whether the privilege was defeated).  
283 Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 140–41 (holding that when more than one conclusion can be 
drawn from undisputed facts, the question should go to the jury). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 Because of Larson, the fair and accurate reporting privilege is 
extended to publications regarding matters of public concern made by 
public officials at official press conferences or in official press releases. The 
public is benefited because limiting media liability encourages reporting on 
government proceedings that are timely, fair, and accurate—a necessity in 
our world today. This protection may encourage the media to bring the 
public closer to government happenings and may even unveil corruption.  
 However, these commendable outcomes do not come without 
caution. Although this extension brings good news to the media, this 
extension will remove a defamed individual’s ability to recover from the 
organization that amplified the defamatory statements if the media reported 
fairly and accurately. Additionally, although the court engaged in a robust 
discussion that established some limits, it risked a lot more than Larson’s 
reputation by remanding the decision to a jury. If, on remand, a jury were 
to find that the media’s report was fair and accurate, a future plaintiff’s ability 
to recover for defamatory statements may be diminished.284 Moreover, it 
could allow the media a broad cushion in their reports of government 
proceedings, which—without fear of liability—could only increase 
disinformation and fake news. Nevertheless, hope remains that one’s 
reputation will not be sacrificed in the name of media protection. 
                                                           
284 See supra Section IV.B.3.b.2. 
35
Lantz: Torts: Sacrificing Individual Recovery for Media Protection—Larso
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
